Saul Kripke : Reference of a name is not determined by its sense

Volume 7, Issue 4, August 2023     |     PP. 200-221      |     PDF (245 K)    |     Pub. Date: July 11, 2023
DOI: 10.54647/sociology841105    55 Downloads     3104 Views  


Sagarika Datta, University of Delhi, India

The concept of essence has played an important role in the history and development of philosophy; and in no branch of the discipline is its importance more manifest than in metaphysics. Its significance for metaphysics is perhaps attributable to two main sources. In the first place, the concept may be used to characterize what the subject or at least part of it, is about. For one of the central concerns of metaphysics is with the identity of things, with what they are. But the metaphysician is not interested in every property of the objects under consideration. In asking ‘what is a person?’, for example, he does not want to be told that every person has a deep desire to be loved, even if this is in fact the case.What then distinguishes the properties of interest to him? What is it about a property which makes it bear, in the metaphysically significant sense of the phrase, on what an object is? It is in answer to this question that appeal is naturally made to the concept of essence. For what appears to distinguish the intended properties is that they are essential to their bearers and what makes it accidental?

De dicto,de re, rigid designators, non-rigid designator, transworld identity

Cite this paper
Sagarika Datta, Saul Kripke : Reference of a name is not determined by its sense , SCIREA Journal of Sociology. Volume 7, Issue 4, August 2023 | PP. 200-221. 10.54647/sociology841105


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